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Editorial 
 
The conference “Tracing Social Inequalities in Environmentally-Induced Migration” was the 
second in a new series of conferences on “Environmental Degradation, Conflict and Forced 
Migration”. It was organised by the European Science Foundation, in cooperation with Biele-
feld University and its Center for Interdisciplinary Research. Already on the occasion of the 
first conference of the series the Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
(COMCAD), the university’s unit responsible for scientific content and quality of the confer-
ence, had launched a COMCAD Working Paper Series on “Environmental Degradation and 
Migration”. In the wake of the second conference, the editors are pleased to now start the 
second round of this working paper series. It intends to give conference participants the op-
portunity to share their research with an even broader audience.  
The 2010 conference focused on how environmental change impacts the interplay between 
vulnerabilities on the one hand and capabilities on the other hand, and how this relationship 
affects mobility patterns. The 2012 conference concentrated on the societal backgrounds of 
this interplay and is meant to integrate a social inequalities perspective into current debates. 
Not all actors are equally vulnerable to climate and environmental change and environmen-
tally-induced migration. Therefore, social inequalities between world regions, countries, geo-
graphical regions, organizations, groups and categories of people involved in environmental 
and climate-induced migration constitute the core thematic focus. Differential susceptibilities 
and capabilities to cope with environmental change on local, national and global scales ra-
ther depend on resource inequalities, power inequalities and status inequalities. Differences 
in vulnerability result from and are reproduced by the unequal impacts actors have upon poli-
tics and society as well as by the material and immaterial resources at their disposal. The 
2012 conference was thus meant to shed light on the role of social inequalities in environ-
mentally-induced migration and the mechanism of its reproduction.  
The researchers invited represented a wide range of disciplines, including sociology, social 
anthropology, migration, conflict, gender and development studies, geography, political sci-
ence, international law, as well as climate and environmental science. The conference was 
well balanced in terms of geographic origin, gender, and academic status of the participants. 
The conference programme and full report can be found at the conference website 
(http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/tdrc/ag_comcad/conferences/envimig2012.html).  
Bielefeld, April 2013      Jeanette Schade and Thomas Faist 
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Abstract 
The physical presence of historic villages and habitats on the Indus Delta is observed to be 
under threat due to environmental changes and permanent disasters. The delta of River In-
dus has distinct social, economical and environmental features as compared to the rest of 
the coast of Pakistan. The delta population, being the lower riparian of the River Indus, re-
ceives a limited flow of fresh water. This is causing environmental degradation and negative-
ly impacting traditional livelihoods, survival and resilience patterns in the presence of high 
levels of social inequality. Climate and environmental changes over time are deemed as a 
root cause of the rise of sea level which is leading to a loss of land, rendering it unusable for 
cultivation, increase in salinity, depletion of mangrove forests and a decline in fish catch. This 
paper is an outcome of field visits to the Indus delta’s inland and the island villages in Kharo 
Chan in particular. In this paper, the focus is on environmentally induced migration caused by 
slow-onset disasters and its linkages with social inequality based on class, caste and kinship 
groups.  
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1. Environment and Climate Change  
Research on migration caused by environmental and climate change is largely deemed as a 
sub-set of social sciences and varying terminologies for such migrants are being debated 
since the last decade. These terms, such as “climate change refugee” or “environmental ref-
ugees”, are of importance in the legal framework of “refugee and protection” mainly for the 
developed countries, but of less importance for counties like Pakistan, where environmental 
or climate change induced or voluntary migration from disaster prone areas to safer places is 
limited to within the country.  
It is a fact that developing countries have suffered numerous environmental and climate 
change disasters; international organizations state that climate change disasters have affect-
ed around 262 million people annually from 2000 to 2004 and the larger proportion of the 
affected population lived in the developing world1. The debate by environmentalists (see Ra-
leigh et al, 2008; Renaud et al, 2007; Brown, 2008; Hugo, 2008; Knivet et al, 2008) is widely 
discussed by Laccko and Aghazarm (2009) who have categorised four major paths by which 
climate change may affect the population and cause migration. They are: 
“Intensification of natural disasters, such as hurricanes and cyclones that destroy housing and liveli-
hoods and requires people to relocate for shorter or longer periods”.  
“Increased warming and drought that affects agricultural production, diminishing people’s livelihoods 
and access to clean water”. 
“Rising sea level that render coastal areas uninhabitable”. 
“Competition over natural resources that may lead to conflict, which, in turn, precipitates displace-
ment”. 
Globally, all four categorised paths of climate change disturb the population and can be ma-
jor causes of temporary and permanent migration. Unfortunately, all four categorised paths 
are valid in the context of Pakistan.   For example intensification of natural disasters such as 
an earthquake of magnitude 7.6 on the Richter scale in 2005 severely damaged the northern 
parts of Pakistan.  This earthquake damaged an area of more than 30,000 square km and 
made over 3.5 million people homeless. Over 85,000 people lost their lives and more than 
                                               
1http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_Summary_English.pdf accessed on 29th Jan 
2013 
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77,000 were injured (IUCN 2005). In the floods of 2010-2011 over 1,700 people died and 
over 18 million people were displaced. The economic cost of damage was reported in the 
range of $8.74 billion to $10.85 billion across Pakistan (Budhani and Gazdar 2011). Al-Qaida 
and Taliban’s violent invasion and military operations in Swat valley displaced almost 38 per 
cent of total population who moved to the urban areas of Peshawar and Karachi to seek ref-
uge (Sayeed et al 2013).  
Increasing temperatures and drought are the main source of permanent migration unlike cy-
clones, floods, storms and earthquakes which may cause only temporary displacement.. The 
population in Pakistan, particularly Sindh and Balochistan, has experienced significant peri-
ods of drought (Gazdar 2007). 
Rising sea level, the third main cause of climate change, has also been the main cause of 
induced migration in Pakistan. In fact, the fourth one path mentioned above is also very rele-
vant to Pakistan’s social, economic and political context. The researcher based in Pakistan 
had highlighted the conflict over natural resources as the main cause of induced migration in 
some parts, particularly in Balochistan (a province of Pakistan). For example, Gazdar (2007) 
discussed that natural resources or rent seeking behaviour between tribes is the source of 
conflict and displacement.  
Migration and causes of migration in a broader sense are also debatable but by narrowing 
down the debate on induced migration by climate change we need to focus the simplified 
international definitions. The IOM (2007) has defined ‘environmental migrants’ as  
“persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons 
of sudden or progressive change in the environment that 
adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged 
to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either 
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within 
their country or abroad.” 
The four paths discussed earlier can be perceived as primary factors or drivers of environ-
mentally induced migration in Pakistan and other developing countries. Environmentalists 
and social science researchers around the world have further tried to theorize such migration 
in terms of temporary verses permanent as well as voluntary verses induced or forced. Dis-
asters such as sudden or humanly unexpected disasters like cyclones, floods, and earth-
quakes divert global attentions as compared to slow-onset environment and climate disasters 
such as drought and rise in sea level. In this paper I have focused on voluntary or induced 
migration caused by slow-onset disasters those are resulting from the reduction of fresh wa-
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ter flows in the Indus Delta and rise in sea level. The following section is about impacts of 
environmental disasters and its correlations with existing social inequality.  
2. Environmental Disasters and Social Inequality 
Gazdar and Mallah (2012) have reopened the debate on class, caste and kinship in light of 
their field studies and by reviewing several past and present research studies (Alavi 1972, 
Ahmed 1977, Hussain 1980, Rouse 1988, Martin 2010 and Eglar 2011). They argue that the 
kinship group, biraderi, zaat or qaum is a social and political unit of solidarity as well as of 
social inequality predominantly in Pakistani Punjab.  
A number of ethnographic accounts of post-colonial Balochistan, particularly the southwest-
ern coastal eco-region of Makran, throw light on inter and intra-tribal social hierarchy.  The 
position of Afro-Baloch descendents of former slaves has been the subject of interest.  The 
owners of the oasis, generally known as hakim, dominated the Afro-Baloch ghulam (literally 
slave, nakeeb, or hizmatgar) as well as other non-hakim cultivators – with all classes being 
identified as patrilineal kinship groups (Field 1955). 
Academics such as Feroze Ahmed (1984) write about Sindh’s traditional village or raj, social-
ly arrayed around dominant landowning families and kinship groups, as already in a state of 
change by the 19th century.  One of the few post-colonial village studies in the province was 
conducted by Honigmann (1960) who also described Sindh’s villages as virtually defined by 
patrilineal kinship groups. Early colonial understanding was influenced by Burnes (1837) who 
saw the Sindhi village as a mobile unit of close kinsfolk which changed its location over time 
and became known by the name of its current leader. Burnes (1837) further says that “To 
quote legends, Sindh has vast number of villages, most of which are moveable. In the desert they are 
called “Wa'ndh,” near the river “Ra'j” and “Ta'nda'” (pp-14). 
The ethnographer Henry Field in his book “An Anthropological Reconnaissance in West Pa-
kistan, 1955” has observed that  
“Kalmatis: Soon after their arrival on the Makran coast the 
Kalmatis conquered the Meds and P (pp-54)“.  
“The women are hard-working and hard-worked. Excluding 
women of dominated classes and of more prosperous fami-
lies, those of poor and nomad groups, the Darzadas, 
Naqibs, Meds, Loris and servile dependents are, generally, 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 9
of lax morals. P. the Baluchis kept many slaves, the fruits 
of their raids. The seamen and fishermen are divided into 
two classes known as the Koras or Langas, and the 
Meds...” (pp-67). 
The academics see existing social inequality on the basis of class, caste and kinship as the 
primary source of social vulnerability and marginalization. The above excerpts from ethno-
graphic and geographical studies also show a high level of persecution of the occupational 
caste groups by powerful invaders and the elite. So by examination of social vulnerability of 
individuals and the groups one can assess their accessibility to and use of human resources 
in normal situations as well as their resilience and response in times of unusual environmen-
tal stress and shocks. Deshingkar (2006) highlights that the poor often adopt internal circular 
migration behaviour in case of environmental stress and other sudden shocks but the poor-
est or most vulnerable are unable to find/do not have the resources to move from one place 
to another. Sen’s (1981) theory of ‘entitlement’ of individuals, groups or communities sees to 
what extent individuals, groups or communities are ‘entitled’ to make use of resources. This 
theoretical approach says that low levels of openness to entitlements and consumption do, 
obviously, affect the ability of individuals, families and communities to deal with shocks. By 
using a similar framework here in this paper I would like to limit the discussion on security of 
entitlements of individuals, families and communities in general and the adverse environment 
and climate impacts on socially vulnerable.  For this purpose I have purposively selected a 
field site in the Delta to focus on the long term hazardous disaster: the rise in sea level 
(Nicholls 2003) and incursion of saline sea water into fertile agricultural and pastoral zones.   
3. Brief Description of the Indus River Basin and Deltaic Ecosystems 
In Pakistan the Indus River is the primary source of water and the Indus Basin is calibrated 
among the world’s biggest basins.  Out of the total basin area of 1,138,810 square kilometers 
around 597,700 (Sq km) falls in Pakistan’s territory.  The River Indus flows about 3,000 kilo-
meters (km) through the mountains of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Punjab and Sindh prov-
inces of Pakistan (ADB 2010).  However, Pakistan is counted among the top arid and most 
water stressed countries.  
Historians and geographers such as Tremenheere (1867) describe the remarkable physical 
and environmental characteristics of the lower portion of the Indus River. Tremenheere 
writes  
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“The Indus, like other tropical rivers, is subject to annual in-
undation, the extent of which had been carefully registered 
for many year both at Sukhur and at Kotree. At the former 
place it generally rises from 12 to 13 feet above a fixed da-
tum, assumed as its low or cold-season level..(pp-69). The 
amount of rainfall in Sind is so small that cultivation may be 
said to be entirely dependent on the rise of riverP..(pp-69). 
The extensive sand-banks formed in the bed of the river are 
frequently many feet above the level  of the water during the 
low season, and become quickly covered by a thick growth 
of young tarmarisk; those which are not swept away by the 
next inundationP(pp-71 The main banks, where they have 
not been cleared for cultivation, are also covered with a lux-
uriant growth of tamarisk and elephant-grass, or forest 
treesP (pp-72) 
The author Trememheere quoted Sir A. Burns’ Travels into Bokhara’ in which he had stated 
that  
“previous to 1792 the Phooran, then a branch of the Indus, 
emptied itself into sea by passing the western shores of 
Chutch..but in 1802 the Indus water was entirely excluded 
by the erection of another bund at Ali BunderP pp-74. 
It is striking that the Trememheere had established a view point regarding the transfor-
mations in Indus delta due to environmental changes and it is very relevant to the subject of 
this case study site from the Thatta district. The author describes that 
 “Whatever may have been the position of the Delta of the 
Indus in former timesP it must now be deemed to com-
mence at some distance to the south of Tatta. It will be seen 
that only branches leave the river from the right bank, the 
Buggaur and Hujjamree. The first, now a small channel, not 
more than 80 yards in width during inundation, discharges 
its water after a very winding course into what must be con-
sidered as a large lagoon extending from the vicinity of Kur-
rachee to the main embouchure of the river; the second, the 
Hujjamaree, carries off a large body of water, about one-
third of that in the main stream KurracheeP(pp-74). 
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Burnes (1837) writes that  
“The great feature of Sind is the IndusP Its Delta, however, 
commences below T’hat’hah in the latitude of 24° 40',* after 
which it enters the sea by eleven mouths, and presents of 
face of 125 British miles to the oceanP. Much of the land 
that is adapted for agriculture, is only used for pasture. 
Much of it also lies neglected; yet the crop of rice is exten-
sive, and far exceeds the consumption of the country. It is 
the staple of Sind; the inhabitants live on it, the merchants 
export itP(pp-12). Its length of course, and the body of wa-
ter discharged by this river, prove it to be one of the largest 
in the old world. Its tributaries even are rivers of some mag-
nitude. The Hydaspes, Hydräotes, and Hesudrus, are supe-
rior to the RhoneP(pp-19)  
Environmentalists and organizations currently working in Pakistan’s eco-regions claim that 
the Indus Delta is comprised over 30,000 sq km in a triangular fan-shaped area. The Indus 
River empties it flows in 17 creeks (Khan 2008). Khan, an environmental journalist in Paki-
stan, in her article “Death of Indus Delta” argues that the rise in sea level due to climate 
change and reduction in fresh flows in the delta is turning acres of fertile agricultural land into 
wasteland2. 
Gulich in his geographical research in 1963 says that 
 “Irrigation works have existed in the Lower Indus Valley for 
centuries. Wheat, millet, and cotton were raised by the peo-
ple of the early Indus Valley civilization of Mohenjo-Daro be-
tween 3000 and 1500 B. C.,PMoguls and early Kalhora 
rulers of sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries 
build and extended canalsP(pp-87) The British, between 
1843, when they took Sind, and 1932, maintained and im-
proved the existing inundation systems. Irrigation acreage 
was enlarged to three million acres early in the twentieth 
century...five-sixths of the land received lift irrigation, where 
                                               
2http://www.lead.org.pk/hr/attachments/Compandium/04_Environmental_Rights/Death_of_th
e_Indus_Delta.pdf accessed on 22 Jan 2013 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 12 
in southern deltaic area two-thirds of the irrigation was by 
flow. This was situation in 1927 alsoP (pp-87-88).  
Gulich further explained that the British government was motivated to develop agricultural 
irrigated land in Sindh through construction of dams or barrages on the Indus River.  The 
author told of construction dates  
“The Sukkur (or Lloyd) Barrage was completed in 1932, the lower Sind (or Ghulam Mohammad) Bar-
rage in 1955; the Gudu Barrage is scheduled for completion in 1962” (pp-83). 
Khan (2008), provides diverse community perceptions and evidences regarding displace-
ment because of sea erosion and both environmentalists and communities relate sea erosion 
to scarcity of fresh water flows in the sea. On other hand, climate scientists see global cli-
mate change as the main precedent for rise in sea level. Some climate scientists don’t see 
fresh flows from the Indus River into the sea as the only solution to reduce sea intrusion 
(Rasulet, al 2012). It is a fact that Pakistan’s growing population needs supply of irrigation 
water for plenty of food production and so far water and water resource management remain 
controversial and politicised between India and Pakistan as well as between upstream and 
downstream provinces. The water experts and politicians from upstream Punjab province 
see flows of water in the delta as an unacceptable loss of water.  
The British government, early 19th century onwards, was preoccupied with converting the 
uncontrolled Indus waters into a scientific irrigation system through the construction of dams 
and water channels in order to divert and store water to increase capacity for crop produc-
tion. The partition of British India created two sovereign states in August 1974 and the ripari-
an issue between Pakistan and India remained at a standstill till March 31, 1948. That stand-
still agreement lapsed when Indian Punjab stopped downstream flows which flared up crises 
in Pakistani Punjab. Finally, the World Bank intervened and the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) 
between Pakistan and India was signed in 1960. According to this treaty, all flows of the 
three eastern rivers of the Indus Basin (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) were awarded to India and 
Pakistan was authorized to use the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) (Gazdar 
2005). However, hydro-politics remained an issue between the two sovereign states and 
between provinces Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa versus Punjab (Mustfa 
2010). 
An IUCN report states that flows of Indus River water have continuously decreased from 
around 185,000 million cubic meters in 1892 to 12,300 million cubic meters per year in the 
1990s.  
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Decrease of fresh water flows in the delta 
Year Flow rate (million cubic 
meter per year) 
Causes 
1892 185,000 Uncontrolled flows 
1932 105,000 Construction of Sukkur Barrage 
1960 79,581 Construction of Kotri Barrage (1956) 
1970 43,000 Indus Water Treaties (1960) 
1990s 12,300 Indus Water Accord within provinces 
Source: IUCN3 
The above data shows a higher decline from 1960s onwards. The Indus River’s pre- 1960s 
uncontrolled fresh water flows in coastal regions of Sindh Province made coastal ecosystem 
more productive including agriculture, mangrove forests and fisheries.  The rapid decline in 
last half century led to a general reduction in the health of the floodplain and Delta ecosys-
tems. The IUCN report portrays the Indus Delta as being more important from a biodiversity 
perspective because it has 10 species of mammals, 143 species of birds, 22 species of rep-
tiles, over 200 species of fishes, many invertebrate species (including 15 species of shrimp) 
and some rare species such as the freshwater dolphin, Platanista minor and the fishing cat. 
The rapid decline in fresh water also damaged the quality of water in the delta and it became 
increasingly saline. The saline sea water has intruded 64 km inland which inlcludes1.2 million 
acres of farmland. Gill et al (2012) very clearly mentioned that because of imbalance be-
                                               
3http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/indus.pdf accessed on 30th January 2013 
 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 14 
tween fresh and brackish water the area had been converted to saline pools. However, the 
delta communities  
“have greeted the 2010 flood with the belief that agricultural land will become fertile due to the dilution 
of salt by freshwater flooding”.  
Ram (2012) has analyzed the reduction of water flows since 2000-1 and strongly empha-
sized that the survival of Indus Delta depends upon Indus water flow into the sea.   Before 
the creation of Pakistan around 80 MAF (1 million acre-feet) of fresh water was allowed for 
downstream Kotri and emptied in the sea. After the Indus Water Accord (IWC) in 1991, be-
tween provinces of Pakistan, the flow was reduced up to 10 MAF. Panhwar (2002) says  
“due to a lack of water in the river flowing to the sea, tide 
water started entering the river. The high tide is about ten 
feet in height and with poor slopes of land of 2 to 3 inches a 
mile (00035 to 0.005%), water reached upstream of Sujawal 
Bridge in the bed of the riverP( pp-23).  
The residents of the deltaic region are forced  into involuntary migration and so far 1.5 million 
people have been displaced (Junejo 2011).  
 
4. Research Site: Kharo Chan 
Pakistan has four broader administrative units or provinces and two provinces, Balochistan 
and Sindh (previously spelled as Sind), have littoral regions over 778 square kilometers with 
the Arabian Sea. Around 350 sq.km of the total coast  of over 778 sq.km and the entire Delta 
of the Indus River lies in the province of Sindh. The primary administrative unit in the prov-
ince is a district and the selected district Thatta (spelled as Tata, T’hat’hah in colonial times) 
is the lower riparian district which covers a larger part of Indus Basin and the Delta. 
At present there are 9 Talukas or secondary administrative units in the district. Out of 9, 6 
Talukas have boundaries with the Arabian Sea. Taluka Kharo Chan is one among the 6 
coastal and deltaic Talukas of the district. The Indus delta in general and the Kharo Chan 
area in particular face serious ecological and economic threats as a result of greatly dimin-
ished Indus water inflows downstream of the main barrages.  Previously fertile agricultural 
lands and entire settlements have been abandoned to seawater intrusion.  The Kharo Chan 
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consists of two sub-regions mostly inland and some islands.  The islands face greater fresh 
water stress and are also cut off from the mainland. Kharo Chan itself is a name of a village 
and a Union Council. This Union Council consists of over 3 island dehs called Bablo, Sukhi 
and Betri.   
Deh is the smallest administrative unit in rural Sindh and the term deh literally means ‘village’ 
in the administrative vocabulary. Several villages and small settlement make up a deh and 
some dehs make up a Union Council, which is the smallest unit of political representation in 
local government. Actual human settlements, known as goths, are smaller entities which 
have only notional linkages with the deh. It is often but not always the case that the largest 
settlement in a deh will share its name with the deh.  Actual villages or goths are often divid-
ed into sub-clusters called para, which are almost always populated by extended families 
belonging to one caste or a kinship group. It is common that big multi-caste villages often 
break up due to several social and environmental changes as well as disputes among caste 
and kinship groups. Even big villages with a single caste break up in small settlements of 
over 8 to 10 households due to disputes over social, economic and political ‘entitlements’.  
5. Field work in 2005 and 2011 
Secondary literature reveals that Kharo Chan was historically the hub of trade in the region, a 
fact that is corroborated by our field interaction. Around a half century ago there were three 
rice mills owned by Hindu banias. Before the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 in two sov-
ereign states India and Pakistan, Hindu merchants dominated trade in Sindh and were active 
in informal banking as money lenders to landlords. Soon after partition the Hindu merchant 
class was forced to leave Pakistan and their properties such as agriculture lands, mills, facto-
ries and living houses were labeled as evacuee property. The government of Pakistan 
awarded their properties to muhajirs-Muslim who migrated from India after the partition. In 
remote areas those properties were also leased to Hindu landlords’ haris (sharecropping 
tenants) and caretakers of their lands. In Kharo Chan most of the evacuee property was 
leased (seven years lease) during the first democratic government led by Zulifkar Ali Bhutto 
to potential local applicants. In the agricultural sector in inland dehs of the delta there are a 
few landlords with large landholdings and many others with smaller holdings.  The landless 
poor in inland villages work as sharecroppers or labourers for the large landlords. Some par-
cels of salinity free land were converted into banana and paan orchards which caused 
changes in sharecropping tenancy patterns. The tenant/labourer’s share in orchards is 1/6th 
of the total produce, while in other crops it ranges from 1/4th to 1/5th of the output.  
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The qualitative phase of this study in 2005 provided basic understanding of social inequality, 
poverty in general and links of both with long term environmental degradation and intentional 
and unintentional migration. The respondents in individual and group interactions reported 
about two cyclones in 1965 and 1999 which changed the demography of the area. The cy-
clone 1965 damaged government buildings and some private brick and lime made houses.  
The Indus water was controlled first time through Gullam Muhammad Barrage constructed at 
Jamshoro, Kotri in 1960 which reduced flows of fresh water in the Indus Delta. After con-
struction of the barrage, two rice mills in Sokhi and one in Bablo became worthless. There 
were three wells with quality drinking water before the early 1960s. 
In early 1970s a saint namely Pir Yar Muhammad Shah (Pushto speaking) came to this area. 
He used to eat raw meat and people were attracted by his miracles. People of the area were 
able to feed him and after his death his shrine was constructed there.  
People call the Indus River “Sindho Nadi” or Sindho canal and the sea as “Dariya”. In 1940 
there was big breach in the sea which made a new mouth for the Indus River and people 
named it as “Phaat Dariya”. Now Bablo deh falls between Phaat Dariya and Mir Wah branch 
of the Indus River. Gharo, a big township at present, is said to be smaller at that time than 
the township called Sokhi Bunder on Mir Wah’s embankment.  The respondents had re-
vealed almost similar demographic features of the Indus Delta or above 17 water emptying 
mouths as in Tremenheere’s and Burnes’s historic demographic research with minor spelling 
differences.  
There were, broadly speaking, three kinship groups with high numerical weights in island deh 
Bablo and several smaller groups.  The most conspicuous were the Kachhis’ who speak 
Kuchhi dialects and are 15 per cent of the population. Kachhis’s are said to be of Kuchh 
(presently Indian territory) origin, those who had migrated to Sindh before the partition of 
India. At present they dominate the main market and also hold agricultural lands. However, 
because of salinity resulting fromsea erosion and scarcity of fresh water flows the land is not 
necessarily a source of potential wealth or income. Kachhis’ are largely occupied in commer-
cial activities as were the Hindu banias.  Kachhi community was known as “zargars” and 
Khattis because of their traditional occupations of dying and washing clothes. But at present 
no one is attached with their ancestral traditional occupation.  
The second prominent group was Khaskhelis, who are perceived as slaves of the ruling 
Baloch Mir’s or Talpur’s dynasty in Sindh. After the end of the Talpur dynasty and during the 
colonial period in Sindh, Khaskhelis indulged in land related labour for the rural landed elite. 
Some of the Khaskheli respondents revealed that their parents used to take care of the lands 
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of Hindu banias in Kharo Chan. After partition, a few got land on lease and others became 
share-tenants of Kachhis’ and other landlords. But due to non-availability of fresh irrigation 
water most of their families adopted marine fishing and other casual labour.  This is the larg-
est caste group in the village and accounts for a quarter of the village population.  There are 
several individuals among the Khaskhelis who were of some local prominence and active in 
politics as well. 
The third group is the Mallah, the name for traditional seafaring communities also known as 
muhana or machayra and med in Pakistan’s coastal belt.  Within the Mallah occupational 
caste there are several distinctive kinship groups known by their paras or biradari or sub-
castes. One of the largest landlords of the village is from a Mallah family, who have extensive 
economic and political links with the powerful fishing cartels based in Ibrahim Hyderi in Kara-
chi.  The Mallah chief is a player in local politics as well as in the wider politics of the sea-
faring communities.  While the extended family of the Mallah chief were important land and 
boat-owners, most of the other Mallah are landless and poor.  There are also other kinship 
groups claiming Mallah status by the virtue of being traditional seafarers and not through any 
proximate kinship association with the empowered Mallah kinship group. 
Caste and kinship, sometimes defined in ethnic terms, are significant markers of identity, 
solidarity and conflict among indigenous and migrant ethnic Baloch tribes. In the delta region, 
traditional occupational groups such as the Mallah (fisher-folk) and carpenters within the 
Kalmati Baloch were perceived as lower status groups. Kalmatis locally known as karmatis 
were reported to be tribal Baloch migrants from coastal Gwadar. There were several caste or 
kinship group among the Kalmatis who dominated fishing jetties, harbours and cultivated 
parcels of the land in inland villages of the Kharo Chan Taluka.  However, in the case of Ba-
blo deh all habitants belong to a socially marginalized class, caste and kinship groups if seen 
in broader understanding of social hierarchy and patterns of social exclusion in Pakistan. 
The Sherazi Syeds were perceived as the dominant landed elite in inland as well as in island 
segments of the Indus Delta. There are considerable economic inequalities across the re-
gion, with evidence of high levels of concentration of land ownership in the hands of econom-
ic elites.  The situation with respect to fishing communities is also marked by high levels of 
inequality and unfavourable concentrations of economic power.  The economic elites in these 
sectors are heavily implicated in the local level environmental challenges to the ecology, par-
ticularly, with respect to deforestation, water body contamination and overfishing.  Local eco-
nomic elites can call upon kinship group solidarity, political networks and religious affiliation 
to maintain their power. 
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For the Kachhi as a group, the incidence of land ownership is 48 per cent and they have sig-
nificantly higher levels of education as compared to the other kinship groups.  In the Mallah 
chief’s kinship group there is a sharp distinction between the chief’s family and the rest of the 
group who is poor and socially marginalized.  
Kharo Chan: Kinship groups and access to entitlements  
 
Share of 
population 
Land 
owners 
Tenant 
farmers 
Highest education in household 
None 
Up to 
primary 
Up to sec-
ondary 
Above 
secondary 
Mallah (poor) 23.5 49 3.3 79.1 11.8 9.2 0 
Mallah (rich) 15.5 12.5 0 67.5 20 2.5 10 
Khaskheli 25.3 10.5 10.5 86.2 6.9 6.9 0 
Kachhi (rich) 15.1 48.4 0 16.1 41.9 32.3 9.7 
Kachhi (poor) 5.1 0 0 91.7 8.3 0 0 
Kalmati Baloch 7.9 4.8 0 85.7 14.3 0 0 
Others 7.6 15 5 50 45 5 0 
Total 100 17 3.3 73.8 16.1 7.3 2.8 
 
The quantitative field work showed that around 99 per cent of houses were made katcha and 
around 94 per cent households reported that they own the built structure of the house. All 
three island dehs had no electricity and gas connections for gas. People used mangroves’ 
wood for cooking purpose.  
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Patriarchy is closely connected with class, caste and kinship hierarchy. Women do not hold 
any assets (such as boats or land); all economic activities are controlled by men and the in-
heritors of assets are also always men. Women are the most vulnerable and marginalised 
where kinship identity remains integral through patrilineal descent. The respondents were not 
sure about their ownership status of the land on which their homes were made. Homestead 
land ownership is a peculiar issue in overall Pakistan particularly in Sindh as most of the vil-
lages are not registered with land revenue departments like they are in Punjab. A smaller 
number of the village in Sindh got sanads, individual ownership entitlements, through the 
Sindh Goth Abad Scheme but a large number of homes are made on government, privately 
owned or occupied land (Gazdar and Mallah 2010). Poor tenants and casual labourers in 
Kharo Chann were reported to be living on land owned or occupied by the landlords. 
The fish lords dominate water resources and the marketing of fish catch. The elite landlords, 
politicians, businessmen with a strong relationship with Karachi fisheries markets, the Fisher-
ies Department of Government of Sindh control the fishing economy  with the collaboration of 
powerful people at the village level.  The poor fisherfolk do not own boats, nets or other fish-
ing equipment and perpetually work as labourers for the fishlord. The moneylenders in the 
Karachi fisheries market and on local jetties play the role of middlemen between the fishlord 
and labourers. A large number of boat holders do not own the boat because the original boat 
ownership documents are with the moneylender who is doing business in local or Karachi 
markets. The boats were given to people after a local middleman’s guarantee. The indebted 
boat holder is responsible to sell the catch to the moneylender on lower than market prices 
which are fixed for the whole season. A few boat holders were reported to be free of debt. 
The people who owned boats also needed loans during the non-fishing season and for 
maintenance of their boats and equipment every year. The indigenous poor for whom fishing 
is a traditional occupation do not have free access to the market due to indebtedness. 
In Kharo Chan it appears to be stark class polarization as most of the residents are landless 
workers either as fisher-folk, haris or wage labourers, who are indebted and have no or little 
access to use of resources. There are few places in inland delta villages where there are in-
between classes such as those who self-cultivate small plots of land.  In addition to the land-
lord/fishlord versus assetless worker division, other economic stakeholders such as traders 
and moneylenders are allied to the economic elite in its relationship with the assetless. 
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6. Migration Stories, Perceptions and Interventions 
It is difficult to gauge the number of people that have migrated, their destinations, how they 
survived there and whether their migration was induced or voluntary specially in cases when 
individuals, families and community migrated because of slow-onset or permanent type of 
the disaster. However, a combination of population census records in Pakistan with qualita-
tive and quantitative field work in the research site gives a number of diverse migration sto-
ries, perceptions and variations in population. Permanent disasters, as compared to tempo-
rary disasters, are given less attention by international relief and rehabilitation organizations, 
but long term factors damaging biodiversity caused permanent induced migration of indige-
nous communities from one place to another (Mallah 2011). The first priority destination of 
environmentally induced migrants is the province’s big urban hub, Karachi. But the assetless 
individuals, families and communities cannot afford permanent migration as compared to 
empowered individuals, families and kinship groups with complicit right over use of available 
resources and assets. The socially marginalised castes and kinship groups with no land ten-
ure and residential security could not migrate or prefer internal circular migration toward the 
safer place within the area or migrant friendly urban centres.  
“Around 250 households permanently migrated to Buhara, Baghan and Gharo within the district. No 
human habitation remained in deh Betri and only a few households remained in deh Sukhi. Many 
households who had livelihood resources in Karachi also migrated permanently” said a respondent.  
It is a fact that environmental or climate change migrants from the selected sites preferred 
Karachi as prime destination, where the tension between regulation and regularization of 
migrants’ cohorts is the main cause of conflict and political violence. Rural to urban migrants 
in search of shelter and livelihood require collective action and effective social and political 
mobilization in order to attain the regularization of the squatter settlements they reside in 
(Gazdar and Mallah 2011).The ethnic political groups in Sindh province and particularly Mut-
tahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) ruling urban Karachi resisted Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) migration from northern Pakistan’s terrorism ridden regions4 and IDPs from rural 
Sindh  who were affected by the 2010 floods5. 
                                               
4http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009/05/23/story_23-5-2009_pg12_4 ac-
cessed on 24 Jan 2013 
5http://crss.pk/downloads/Reports/Special-
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The following table shows variation in population ratio of increase in urban towns and de-
crease in population ratio in the rural deltaic settlements (three dehs in Taluka Kharo Chan) 
directly affected by decline of flows fresh water, rise  in sea level and salinity.  
Population and variation due to migration  
  
Census 
year 
1971  
Census 
Year 
1981 
Percent 
Variation 
between 
1971-
1981 
Census 
Year 
1989 
Percent 
Variation 
between 
1981-
1998 
Collective 
Census 
2005 
Percent 
Variation 
between 
Census 
1998 
and 
2005 
survey 
District Thatta 695,861 761,039 9 1,113,194 46 *** *** 
Kharo Chan 
Taluka *** 16,903 
*** 
25,700 52 *** *** 
Bablo 1,890 2,000 6 2,363 18 1,831 -23 
Betri, Nind 979 847 -13 754 -11 10 -99 
Sokhi 127 164 29 85 -48 0 -100 
 
The population district headquarters or non-fishing and non-agricultural area increased by 9 
per cent between 1971 and 1981 and increased from 46 to 52 percents between 1989 and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Posts/Karachi%20Seething%20under%20Violence%20and%20Terror.pdf accessed on 24 Jan 
2013 
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1998. In deltaic dehs during 1971 and 1981 there was an increase in population by 6 per 
cent and 29 percent in Bablo and Sokhi respectively but in Betri there was a decrease in 
population of 13 per cent. Between 1989 and 1998 there was an increase in population only 
in Bablo and a high decrease in Sohki. Our qualitative and quantitative field survey in year 
2005 shows 23 percent decrease in Bablo and around 100 per cent decrease in both Betri 
and Sokhi dehs.  
A Khaskheli responded stated “We cannot move from here. We need a ‘Bund’, an embankment, to 
protect our village from saline water and high tides”. He had some parcel of land on lease but he 
had not cultivated it since 1990s. Individuals and families who had relatives in Karachi can 
move and get work there but others cannot. “We used to grow ‘Khara Ganja’ red rice here some 
decades ago but now we can only grow some vegetables during the June-July flooding in River Indus” 
said a Kachhi respondent.  
“We are not free people but enslaved by the ‘dalals’ middle men who provide us debts to purchase 
‘rachh’ fishing nets and cash for  the repair of our boats, we often sell our fish catch to the money 
lenders in the market at half prices because we are indebted”  shared a Mallah boat owner  
Our respondents revealed that mangroves and fresh water from Indus River are the main 
sources or dens of fish breeding but the depletion of mangroves and salinity have caused a 
large number of fish species such as the palaa or hilsha and other shrimps to disappear. 
There is no livelihood source other than deep fishing and now all deep fishing contracts have 
been given to international companies. These companies use fishing nets such as the Boolo 
and Gujo, which cause significant damage as they catch small fish or minnows which are 
then used for chicken feed.   
“We have no option other than to leave this area permanently, but where and how can we afford to 
purchase new homestead land” said a respondent. During field work in 2005 we met a person 
known as “Doctor”, who was a health technician. He was the only person with a motorbike 
and “clinic” in a small shop who was providing health treatment in all big and small hamlets 
inside deh Bablo. He was believed to be the only well educated person in the village and was 
a good story writer in the Sindhi language. Doctor drew a demographic map of the delta on 
my field diary in which he clearly mentioned Manhoro and Korangi creeks and mouths from 
Karachi to Seer mouth in Badin near Indian Kuchh. His demographic map resembled 
Tremenheere’s historic maps. During 2005 some of his family members had migrated to Ib-
rahim Hyderi Jetty in Karachi but Doctor had stayed in his ancestral village.  
However, Doctor was not in the village in 2011. “He is gone from here permanently. Recently his 
mother died and he buried his mother there in Karachi” his relative told us.  “Yes, we believe if a 
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family chooses another destination and intend to bury their deceased there than that family may be 
counted as a permanent migrant” he continued.  
A respondent from an empowered Mallah kinship group we met in 2005 told us that not one 
outsider researcher or NGO worker had visited deh Bablo before, with the exception of some 
political leaders and female health workers. His family was active in the Pakistan Peoples’ 
Party and facing their opponents Sherazi Syed families associated with the Pakistan Muslim 
League (Quaid-e-Azam). During our second meeting in 2011 he told us that all of his family 
members had shifted to Karachi and all their children were studying in Karachi. He further 
revealed that a number of NGOs were present who played a role in service delivery, infra-
structure development, employment and micro-credit. For example, Pakistan Fisherfolk Fo-
rum (PFF) in Kharo Chan had mobilized poor fishing communities to fight for their rights. The 
government, in cooperation with local advocacy organisations, has introduced some safety 
networks for fishing communities and has provided direct access to fish catch, nets, and 
boats. Another nationally operational social protection cash transfer programme for poor 
women was launched by Pakistan Peoples’ Party’s government called Benazir Income Sup-
port Programme (BISP) in 2008. There are a fair number of women beneficiaries in our re-
search site.  
“There are around 200 BISP beneficiaries here. Our women don’t go to receive money but we send a 
person who collects money from the post office in Baghan”, said a respondent from a BISP bene-
ficiary household. The government has also introduced cash transfer modalities such as 
smart and debit cards for women’s direct access.  
The respondents, during qualitative field work in 2011, were apprehensive about a mega 
project launched by the current provincial government of Sindh led by Pakistan Peoples’ Par-
ty. This mega project is named as “Zufilkarabad Mega City” operational under Zulfikarabad 
Development Authority (ZDA) along the coastal strip of the Indus Delta6. This mega project 
will seize around 1.3 million acres in four deltaic Talukas including Kharo Chan of District 
Thatta. Some environmental experts say that more than two-third of the land used for this 
mega city project is under a sea intrusion threat7 while others are of the view that no such 
study on environmental impact assessment for the mega project is done according to the 
                                               
6http://zda.gos.pk/  accessed on 2nd Feb 2013. 
7http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-19680-Zulfikarabad-project-environmental-
threats-being-reviewed accessed on 2nd Feb 2013. 
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Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 19978.  The indigenous communities always view the 
mega projects as a conspiracy against their identity and for their forced evictions from their 
homestead lands. A series of mega projects including some controversial projects were 
launched by last military government in Balochistan, especially for the coast of Gwader 
(Budhani and Mallah 2010).  
The respondents in inland and island dehs of the area fear for their leased or occupied gov-
ernment agricultural lands with no secure entitlements. The farmers and landlords are wor-
ried if they will get plenty of compensation for their land with no secure tenure. Poor tenants, 
landless individuals, families and communities in inland and island villages are worried about 
their homestead land with no secure tenure or entitlements. The marginalized sections of the 
population are also hoping for increase in employment opportunities and an alternative to 
having to move to Karachi. The landed elite are hoping for heavy compensations for  their 
land that was acquired for the mega city project.  
“Under a secret agreement the land of Sokhi deh has been sold to America and the government wants 
to displace all poor and indigenous communities from here. That is why the government is not ready to 
allow fresh water in the delta”, said an NGO worker.  
A political worker said that “this government has roots in all types of  ethnic groups in their political 
constituencies. Therefore, there is little chance of forced evictions or displacement against no com-
pensations. The ruling party has struggled a lot against unfair sharing of Indus waters in the past”.  
People who were depending on agriculture directly or indirectly owned large number of do-
mestic animals and pasture lands. Mangroves and other shrubs were the main grazing 
sources for their animals.  
“There is no electricity, supply of gas or drinking water in all 
three island dehs. We use shrubs and mangroves as cook-
ing fuel and buy drinking water cans. Now some NGOs 
have controlled cooking fuel and animal grazing resources. 
Yes, we will allow those NGOs to protect or grow more 
mangroves but only if they will provide us with substitute re-
sources and infrastructure”  
a social and political worker revealed.  
                                               
8http://dawn.com/2012/08/27/zulfikarabad-or-indus-delta-revival/ accessed on 3rd Feb 2013. 
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7. Conclusion 
The protection of environmental and climate change migrants or refugees and the debate on 
the legal framework of refugees’ rehabilitation is a matter of major concern for international 
humanitarian as well as development oriented organizations. But there is little focus on grad-
ual or slow-onset disasters and there is little ethnographic research work in the regions under 
severe permanent threats because of environmental and climate change. Although most 
developing countries have signed international conventions on the protection of environmen-
tal and climate change migrants and refugees, there is no or little background research for a 
wider understanding with right to use of resources by the marginalized sections of population 
of these coastal and deltaic disaster zones.  
In developing countries like Pakistan, India and Bangladesh where basic social and econom-
ic inequality has been is well researched through class, caste, religion and ethnicity lenses 
but less ethnographical work on existing social inequality and its correlations with  environ-
mental and climate induced migration.  
Identification of socially marginalized sections through population surveys, particularly in en-
vironmental and climate hazardous regions, targeted social protection programmes such as 
BISP and residential land allotments are believed to be potential instruments of social protec-
tion reforms.  
Social science researchers’ contribution to climate change and global warming science may 
prioritise linking existing social inequality with induced or voluntary migration in both, tempo-
rary or permanent disasters cases. The Indus Basin’s controlled fresh water flows might be 
potential for perennial agricultural products and vital for food security but water management, 
environmental experts and pro-development national and international organizations need to 
regard the indigenous habitants of the coast and the Indus Delta’s ecology.  
Disputes regarding Indus Waters between India and Pakistan and upper and lower riparian 
provinces of Pakistan, the demand for construction of more dams and political movements 
against mega dam projects are ongoing simultaneously. A high decline in fresh water flows in 
Indus Delta is a contentious issue for water and environmental experts in the region. The 
evidence from historic, geographical and ethnographic research and evidences and percep-
tions from diverse community groups and individuals provide an authentic viewpoint that 
gradual and rapid decline in fresh water flows in Indus Delta is main cause of sea intrusion. 
However, the main disadvantageous groups are those who are socially marginalized, asset-
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less, with poor networks in urban residential and commercial markets and are therefore, 
more vulnerable to this slow-onset environmental disaster.  
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